When people talk about polarization today, the usual suspects come up first. Social media. Cable news. Donald Trump. Twitter mobs. Facebook algorithms.
But the truth is, the breakdown of political discourse in America did not start in the last decade. It did not even begin with the internet. What we’re experiencing today is the culmination of a century-long unraveling of how we talk, how we argue, and how we disagree.
Let’s start in the early 20th century. Imagine walking down Main Street in 1935. Every corner has a newspaper stand, and those newspapers are not neutral. They are fiercely partisan. But they are widely shared. Whether you agreed or disagreed, you were at least reading the same headlines as your neighbor.
Franklin D. Roosevelt understood the power of shared communication. His radio addresses, the “fireside chats,” gave millions of Americans the sense that the president was speaking directly to them. In 1933, after the banking collapse, he told the country, “We have provided the machinery to restore our financial system; it is up to you to support and make it work. It is your problem no less than it is mine.” That line matters. He spoke of “our problem.” He built trust by making citizens part of the solution.
But there were limits. Marginalized voices, those of women, minorities, and immigrants, were often excluded from these conversations. Still, compared to today, America was at least in the same room, disagreeing over the same facts.
In the early 1950s, the nation faced another rupture in discourse during the Red Scare. Senator Joseph McCarthy rose to prominence by alleging that communists had infiltrated the U.S. government. His hearings, broadcast on television, turned into spectacles where accusations often carried more weight than evidence. Careers were destroyed, lives upended, and nuance all but disappeared.
The “Army-McCarthy Hearings” of 1954 marked the breaking point. When lawyer Joseph Welch finally asked McCarthy, “Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last?” the senator’s public credibility collapsed. Yet the damage was already done. The lesson of McCarthyism was clear: fear and suspicion could silence dissent and redefine political discourse, shifting debates from policy to loyalty tests.
Fast forward to the 1960s. Television changed everything.
The 1960 Kennedy/Nixon debate is the perfect example. On the radio, contemporaries observed Nixon sounded competent. But on television, he appeared sweaty and nervous. Kennedy looked confident, even presidential. As historian Theodore White wrote in his work The Making of the President 1960: “The men who heard it on radio thought Nixon had won; the millions who saw it on television thought Kennedy had won.”
Perception became as important as policy.
Television also forced Americans to confront realities they could once ignore. The Civil Rights Movement brought the brutality of Jim Crow into living rooms. Viewers saw fire hoses and police dogs unleashed on peaceful marchers in Birmingham. For many, this was the first undeniable evidence of the depth of racial injustice.
Then came Vietnam. The war was the first to be broadcast nightly into homes. When Walter Cronkite, the trusted CBS anchor, told Americans in 1968 that the war would likely end in stalemate, President Lyndon Johnson supposedly said: “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost Middle America.”
By the 1970s, with Watergate, public trust collapsed. Nixon’s resignation in 1974 was a televised national trauma. Institutions no longer seemed untouchable.
The 1980s marked the beginning of true fragmentation. CNN launched in 1980, ushering in the 24-hour news cycle. Honestly, in my view, this was one of the most paradigm-shifting moments in the American zeitgeist. It wasn’t just a headline or a passing controversy; it was a cultural tremor that sent shockwaves through the foundations of how we see ourselves. And like any true tremor, the waves didn’t stop at the epicenter. They rippled outward, reshaping institutions, reshaping politics, reshaping even the way neighbors speak to each other at the dinner table. Instead of summarizing events, cable news turned them into prolonged spectacles.
Meanwhile, talk radio surged. Rush Limbaugh became the voice of conservative anger. By the 1990s, he reached 20 million listeners each week. In his book The Way Things Ought to Be, he bragged, “I am equal time.” He wasn’t pretending to be neutral. He was giving his audience a voice they felt mainstream media denied them.
In 1987, the FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine, which required broadcasters to air opposing views. That opened the door for openly partisan media. Soon, Fox News was founded as a conservative alternative. MSNBC eventually leaned left.
Politics followed the same script. In 1990, Newt Gingrich circulated a memo through GOPAC called Language: A Key Mechanism of Control. It urged Republicans to describe Democrats with words like “traitor,” “pathetic,” and “sick.” Political rhetoric shifted from disagreement to vilification.
By the time of Bill Clinton’s impeachment in 1998, the message was clear: politics was no longer about compromise. It was war.
At first, the internet seemed like a gift to democracy. Anyone could start a blog. Information was free, open, and unfiltered. Gatekeepers no longer controlled the conversation.
But chaos followed. The Iraq War showed the dangers. In 2002, Condoleezza Rice warned of “a smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” Major outlets like The New York Times echoed the claims. When no weapons of mass destruction were found, public trust cratered.
At the same time, conspiracy theories flourished online. “Truthers” insisted 9/11 was an inside job. Later, “birthers” questioned Barack Obama’s citizenship. The internet allowed fringe ideas to find audiences without challenge.
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 and the Obama administration’s stimulus package, a new movement surged on the right: the Tea Party. It was a populist wave that combined economic frustration with anger at government expansion. Starting in 2009, what began as grassroots protests quickly evolved into a powerful faction within the Republican Party.
Tea Party rallies often featured signs declaring “Taxed Enough Already” or “Keep Government Out of My Medicare.” The contradictions didn’t matter. What mattered was the rhetoric of betrayal, the idea that Washington had stopped listening to “real Americans.” The Tea Party sharpened partisan lines, rewarding politicians who refused to compromise. Figures like Ted Cruz rose to prominence by turning legislative standoffs into ideological battles.
The movement proved that anger could be organized and monetized in the age of 24-hour media. But in the process, it hardened discourse further. Compromise wasn’t just undesirable; it was treated as treason to the cause.
By the 2010s, social media had rewired the way we think. Facebook’s News Feed wasn’t designed to inform. It was designed to keep us scrolling. Outrage was more engaging than nuance, and so outrage won.
On the other side of the spectrum, 2011 brought the Occupy Wall Street movement. In New York’s Zuccotti Park, protesters camped out to highlight economic inequality and the growing power of financial elites. Their slogan, “We are the 99%,” captured frustration with a system that seemed to serve only the wealthiest Americans.
Unlike the Tea Party, Occupy rejected formal leadership and traditional political organization. It thrived on symbolic protest, the spectacle of tents and assemblies in public squares. This horizontal structure made it difficult to translate energy into policy change, but it reshaped discourse. Terms like “the 1%” and “income inequality” moved from activist circles into mainstream political language.
Yet Occupy also showed the limits of modern protest. Media coverage often focused on confrontations with police rather than ideas. Critics dismissed the movement as leaderless and chaotic. And while it shifted vocabulary, it deepened the sense of two Americas talking past one another: one focused on government overreach, the other on corporate greed.
In 2018, the New York Times revealed how Cambridge Analytica harvested the data of millions of Facebook users to manipulate political messaging. People weren’t just being informed. They were being targeted.
The 2016 election made this impossible to ignore. Russian troll farms created fake accounts to sow division. Memes and conspiracy theories outperformed policy discussions. As Ezra Klein later wrote in Why We’re Polarized: “We don’t just disagree on issues; we disagree on what the issues are.”
Then came the pandemic. Public health guidance shifted as science evolved, but each change was framed as proof of dishonesty. Dr. Anthony Fauci, for example, said in March 2020 that masks weren’t necessary, then later pushed for universal masking. To many, this wasn’t evidence of adaptation, but of betrayal.
The algorithms fed the anger. Trust collapsed further.
Today, Americans no longer simply disagree. They live in different realities. A Fox News viewer and an MSNBC viewer can watch the same event and come away with opposite interpretations.
This is more than polarization. It is the destruction of shared discourse. Without a common foundation of facts, there can be no meaningful debate. Without debate, liberty itself begins to hollow out.
And here’s the irony: this fragmentation is exactly what America’s adversaries once hoped for. During the Cold War, Soviet defector Yuri Bezmenov described “ideological subversion,” the process of undermining a society’s confidence in its own institutions. That dream has been realized, not through espionage, but through our own media ecosystems.
This decline was not inevitable. It happened because governments, corporations, and we, the people, made choices, often for short-term gain. The question now is whether we can reclaim the forum.
We cannot go back to Walter Cronkite. Nostalgia won’t fix this. But we can build new spaces where disagreement is not censored, but structured. Where the argument is not performance, but dialogue.
Liberty requires conversation. Without it, we are not citizens engaged in self-government. We are just tribes shouting across the void.